内部人举报制度、舞弊风险与审计定价

Internal Whistle-blowing Mechanis叫Fraud Risk and Audit Pricing

后萨班斯时代,内部人举报已被验证成为现代企业舞弊风险管理的有效预防手段。通过手工收集我国上市公司内部人举报建设数据以及挖掘制度文本,实证研究发现,提供企业内部人举报的“吹哨”效应的制度建设,能够防患企业内部舞弊风险,抑制企业潜在的重大错报风险,进而影响审计定价。通过中介效应模型发现,内部人举报系统能够显著降低企业财务重述与接到问询函的概率,抑制审计意见购买导致的审计费用增长;进一步研究表明,公司纪委的参与能够增强员工举报制度的执行力度,对平抑审计定价具有调节作用。内部人举扌艮这一渠道对于审计定价影响的新兴市场验证结果,为现阶段国家层面的内部举报体系建设提供了审计视角的政策借鉴。

In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley era,internal whistle-blowing has proved to be an effective channel for preventing fraud risk in modem enterprises.After manually collecting the data of internal whistle-blowing mechamism of listed companies in China and the text scoring of whistle-blowing mechamism,we find that the whistle-blowing system of insider reports reduces the risk of internal fraud,inhibits the potential risk of material misstatement,and thus affects the audit pricing.Through the mediating effect model,empirical results suggest that the internal whistle-blowing system significantly reduces the probability of financial restatement and receiving CSRC inquiry letters,and restrains audit cost increase caused by audit opinion shopping.Further analysis shows that the participation of the discipline inspection commission enhances the implementation of the internal whistleblowing system.From the perspective of audit pricing,this paper provides empirical evidence for the risk mitigation role of internal whistle-blowing system.