垄断企业数字内容产品最优版权保护与定价决策

Optimal copyright protection and pricing decision of digital content products in monopoly enterprise

随着科技的发展以及数字产品的市场需求增加,盗版产品越来越多.研究了垄断企业在存在版权保护成本的情况下,在不同市场条件下对数字内容产品版权的最优决策(版权保护强度以及产品定价).提出了一个版权保护成本函数,并且具体刻画了版权保护成本与版权保护强度及产品价格之间的关系.按照市场消费者情况,将市场分为两种:无盗版市场及盗版市场.研究结果表明,版权保护强度并不是越高越好;且对于垄断企业来说:当消费者盗版厌恶度较低时,盗版市场与无盗版市场最终利润几乎无差异;当消费者盗版厌恶度较高时,不采取版权保护措施反而更有利.

With the development of technology and the increasing market demand for digital products,there are more and more pirated products.The optimal decision(intensity of copyright protection and product pricing)of a monopoly enterprise for the copyright of digital content products was studied under different market conditions and the existence of copyright protection cost.A cost function of copyright protection was given,which specifically depicts the relationship between copyright protection cost,copyright protection intensity and product price.According to the situation of consumers,the market was divided into two types:non-piracy market and piracy market.The results show that the copyright protection intensity is not as high as possible.In addition,when consumer piracy aversion is low,the profit of the piracy market is almost the same as that of the non-piracy market;when consumer piracy aversion is high,it is more beneficial not to take copyright protection measures for the monopoly enterprise.