赶超战略下政府创新偏好对企业创新产出的影响机制:理论与经验证据

A Study on Influence Mechanism of Government Preference for Innovation on Corporate R&D Under the Technology Catch-up Strategy:Theoretical and Empirical Evidence

赶超战略下政府对企业的高外部性创新活动以及创新成果存在较强偏好,并可能利用对国有企业的控制权推进赶超进程。在动态博弈模型中考虑政府对创新成果及高外部性的偏好,讨论政府实施事前成本补贴和事后成果奖励对企业创新产出的不同影响,分析国有企业情境下的影响差异。进一步的实证检验结果表明,国有企业决策者能较好跟随政府创新偏好,使政府提高事前成本补贴更有利于其提升创新产出,在无资助情况下也会使其创新水平高于非国有企业;但会导致事后成果奖励的激励作用不显著。事后成果奖励水平不会影响企业创新产出,但该资助模式可以将政府创新偏好传递给非国有企业,激励其提升创新产出,缩小与国有企业的创新差距。在提供事前成本补贴的同时进行事后成果奖励可以提升事前成本补贴的激励效果。

Under the catch-up strategy,the government has a strong preference for corporate high-externality innovation activities and innovation achievements,and can promote the catch-up process by controlling state-owned enterprises(SOEs).This paper considers the government s preference for innovation achievements and high externalities in a dynamic game model,examines the impact of the government s committed regime innovation subsidies and non-committed regime innovation rewards on corporate innovation output,discusses the differences in the context of SOEs,and empirically tests the conclusions.Our results show that the decision-makers of SOEs can accurately implement the government s innovation preference,so that the increase of committed regime subsidies is conducive to the improvement of innovation output,and the innovation output of SOEs is more than that of non-SOEs in the case of no funding,but it can also lead to the non-significant incentive effect of non-committed regime rewards on SOEs.The levels of non-committed regime rewards will not affect corporate innovation output,but this funding mode can transfer the government s innovation preference to non-SOEs,stimulate their innovation output,and narrow the gap between them and SOEs.The incentive effect of committed regime subsidies can be increased by providing non-committed regime rewards simultaneously.