稳定型机构投资者退出威胁能够抑制国有企业过度投资吗?

Can the Exit Threat of Stable Institutional Investors Curb Over-Investment of State-Owned Enterprises?

本文基于中国国有企业过度投资的视角,关注了国有企业中稳定型机构投资者退出威胁的经济后果。以2007-2017年间沪深A股国有上市公司为样本,实证检验了退出威胁与国有企业过度投资间的关系。研究发现,稳定型机构投资者退出威胁对国有企业过度投资行为具有抑制作用,即稳定型机构投资者退出威胁程度越高,国有企业过度投资的概率越低,这一结论在控制了影响滞后性、内生性等问题后依然成立。进一步研究发现,信息透明度、代理成本、外部经济环境产生了调节效应,即企业信息透明度越高、代理冲突程度越低以及外部经济环境不确定性越强,则稳定型机构投资者退出威胁对过度投资的抑制作用更强。

Based on the perspective of over-investment of Chinese state-owned enterprises,this paper focuses on the economic consequences of the withdrawal threat of stable institutional investors in state-owned enterprises.This paper takes the state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A shares from 2007 to 2017 as samples to empirically test the relationship between exit threat and over-investment of state-owned enterprises.The study found that the withdrawal threat of stable institutional investors has a restraining effect on the over-investment behavior of stateowned enterprises,that is,the higher the withdrawal threat of stable institutional investors,the lower the probability of over-investment of state-owned enterprises.This conclusion is still valid after controlling the lag and endogeneity of the impact.Further research finds that information transparency,agency cost and external economic environment have Regulatory effects,i.e.the higher the transparency of enterprise information,the lower the degree of agency conflict and the stronger the uncertainty of external economic environment,the stronger the inhibitory effect of stable institutional investor withdrawal threat on over-investment.