农业保险对农民生产决策的作用机制

Mechanism of Agricultural Insurance on Farmers'Production Decision-making

基于金融市场进入受限视角,分析农民获得农业保险补贴时的最优行为选择,并通过数理推导,证明了农业保险会对农民的生产决策产生影响,但并没有改变其风险偏好。研究发现:由于受有限理性、市场摩擦和市场失灵等因素影响,农民和保险公司会进入金融市场中跨度不同的封闭子集。因此,农民和保险公司会在各自的市场子集内对替代农业保险的其他风险规避方案进行评估。由于农民和保险公司仅在各自的金融市场跨度内对金融产品的正交投影进行定价,因此农户的支付意愿要低于保险公司的接受意愿。对农业保险的补贴有助于拉近农民和保险公司对农业保险估值的认知差距。因此,农业保险补贴仅通过改变农作物的自然收益率和农民对待边际风险的态度来影响他们的生产选择,这种影响应归因于农业保险补贴带来的更多收益机会,而不是农民风险偏好的转变。

From the perspective of limited access to financial market,this paper analyzes the optimal behavior choice of farmers when they obtain agricultural insurance subsidies.And by means of mathematical deduction,it also proves that agricultural insurance will have influences on farmers'production decision-making,however,it does not change their risk preference.This paper finds that due to limited rationality,market friction and market failure,etc.,farmers and insurance companies will enter closed subsets with different spans of financial market.Therefore,farmers and insurance companies will evaluate other risk-avoiding scheme of replacing agricultural insurance in their respective market subsets.Because farmers and insurance companies'only price orthographic projection of financial products within their respective financial market span,the willingness of farmers to pay is lower than what the insurance company willing to accept.The subsidies to agricultural insurance are good for narrowing the gap between the farmers and insurance companies in their cognition of agricultural insurance valuation.Therefore,agricultural insurance subsidies only affect farmers'production choice through changing the natural return rate of crops and their attitude towards marginal risks,which should be attributed to more yield opportunities brought by agricultural insurance subsidies,rather than the change of farmers'risk preference.