论丹尼尔·丹尼特意向性的实在性

On the Reality of Daniel C.Dennett’s Conception of Intentionality

当代心智哲学有关意向性的争论首先集中在“人的大脑中是否真的有概念、信念和判断等”这一问题,由此发展出实在论和取消主义两种相对的立场观点。丹尼特将自己有关意向性的看法称为“意向立场”观,从常识心理入手将意向立场中运行的物质系统重新定义为意向系统,力求在物理世界中为意向性解释锚定一个合适的位置;是一种反本质主义的、温和的意向性实在论立场。意向立场观为我们理解意向性及其实在性提供了一种比较新颖的视角和一些更加合理的研究方法,也为之后意识和意向性的自然化作出了很好的理论铺垫。

The debate on intentionality in contemporary philosophy of mind begins with the question“whether there exists concepts,beliefs and judgments in the human brain”,and then develops two opposite standpoints of realism and eliminativism.Dennett named his view on intentionality as“the intentional stance”,a kind of anti-essentialism and moderate realism of intentionality.He redefines the material system operating in the intentionality stance as intentionality systems from the perspective of commonsense psychology,and tries to rationalize the interpretation of intentionality in the physical world.The concept of intentional stance provides not only a new perspective and some reasonable research methods for us to understand intentionality and reality,but also a theoretical basis for the naturalization of consciousness and intentionality.