基于前景理论的供应链金融平台行为监管演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Supply Chain Financial Platform Behavioral Regulation Based on Prospect Theory

从监管机构视角出发将前景理论引入供应链金融平台行为监管研究中,运用演化博弈方法研究平台和监管机构间的博弈过程,得到根除平台违规问题的约束条件和关键因素,利用MATLAB仿真分析各因素对平台行为演化的影响特征,联系实际情况给出促进有效行为监管的建议。研究发现:因有限理性的存在和金融环境等的影响,理想的约束条件在现实中难以全部达到,平台违规问题难以完全根除;降低平台运营成本、监管成本和超额利润,提高平台对监管处罚和供应链金融风险的感知,加大监管机构对平台违规问题的监管力度和重视程度,可有效提升行为监管效果。

From the perspective of regulators,the prospect theory is introduced into the supply chain financial platform behavioral regulation,the method of evolutionary game is used to research the game process of the platform and regulators,and constraint conditions and key factors in the absence of platform violation are obtained.MATLAB simulation is used to analyze the influence of various factors on the characteristics of platform behavior evolution.Further,regulatory suggestions are put forward.The results show that:due to the existence of bounded rationality and the influence of the financial environment,it is difficult to achieve all the ideal constraints in reality,and platform violation cannot be eradicated.Reducing the platform's operating costs,regulatory costs and excess profits,improving the platform's perception of regulatory penalties and supply chain financial risks,and strengthening regulators'supervision on platform violation can effectively improve the effect of behavioral regulation.