不确定性与业绩补偿承诺--基于期权博弈角度

Uncertainty and Performance Compensation Commitment——Based on the Option theory and Game Theory

以实物期权理论与博弈论理论为基础,推导了目标公司现金流不确定性对业绩补偿承诺的作用机制,并以我国2008-2018年签订了业绩补偿承诺的并购事件为样本,验证了模型推导结果。结果表明:目标公司现金流不确定性越大,目标公司越可能在承诺期结束时支付补偿款;随着不确定性增大,补偿款占交易对价的比例越小,文中的研究为并购实务中业绩补偿承诺合同条款的设计提供了理论支撑。

Based on real option theory and game theory,this paper deduces the mechanism of the target company’s cash flow uncertainty on performance compensation commitment,and takes the M&A event of China’s performance compensation commitment from 2008 to 2018 as a sample.The model derivation results were verified.The results show that the greater the uncertainty of the target company’s cash flow,the more likely the target company will pay the compensation at the end of the commitment period;as the uncertainty increases,the proportion of compensation to the transaction consideration will be smaller.The research in this paper provides theoretical support for the design of contractual terms of performance compensation commitment in M&A practice.