隐匿行为下的地方政府自行发债最优监管契约

Optimal Regulatory Contract for the Bond Issuance by Chinese Local Governmentunder Hidden Action

本文借鉴Holmstrom(1999)隐匿行为下道德风险问题及Laffont和Tirole(1988)多阶段建模思想,结合中国地方政府隐匿行为和中央政府隐性担保情境,构建单期和两期的最优监管契约模型,给出了中央政府最优监管契约设计的一般框架,并分别通过算例对理论模型进行验证。理论推导和算例分析结果表明,单期情形下,通过将中央对地方的分配规则与地方政府的努力程度挂钩,中央能够为地方增加努力提供有效激励,进而有助于社会福利改善;考虑声誉效应情形下,地方政府会在两期下的第一期比单期更加努力。该研究为中央对地方政府发行债券的监管契约设计提供了理论依据。中央可以根据地方政府的实际情况,结合单期和两期下的结论设计监管策略。

Based on the moral hazard problem in Holmstrom’s(1999)and the multi-stage modeling in Laffont and Tirole(1988),this paper constructs an optimal supervision contract that takes into account local governments’moral hazard and the central government’s implicit debt guarantee under single-period and two-period cases.It gives a general framework of the central government optimal supervision contract design and then uses numerical examples to verify the theoretical results.The results show that the central government can provide effective incentives for local governments to increase their efforts by linking the central government’s sharing rules with local governments’efforts under the single-period case,which contributes to the improvement of social welfare.Considering the reputation effect,local governments will work harder at the first period in the two-period context than that in the one-stage context.The study provides a theoretical basis for the central government to design the regulatory mechanism for the bond issuance by local governments.This paper also provides many implications for the central government to design its supervision strategies based on specific local governments’conditions.