PPP风险分担管理与民营企业参与度研究

The Study of Risk Sharing Management and Participation of Private Enterprise in PPP Project

为缓解政府财政支出压力,提升社会资本活力,更好满足社会公众对基础设施和公共服务日益增长的需求,PPP模式在我国实施并大力推广,然而与国有企业相比,民营企业在PPP实践中的参与度较低且呈下降趋势,未能真正分摊国家政府部门的财政支出压力,对于市场活力的激励作用不够明显,与PPP模式在我国大力推广的初衷并不相符。民营企业对PPP项目参与不足是我国PPP改革中的关键课题,通过梳理文献,认为政府完善的风险分担管理对民营企业PPP项目的参与度具有决定作用,并依据演化博弈理论和PPP模式在我国的实践经验,建立了风险分担管理影响民营企业参与PPP项目决策的演化博弈模型,演绎了政府部门和民营企业的策略选择过程。通过对这一过程的演化博弈分析,明晰了民营企业参与PPP项目积极性降低现象的形成机理和治理这一问题的激励措施。研究表明:在PPP项目大力推广时期,受到政策扶持鼓励,民营企业对PPP项目的参与度较高,然而随着PPP实践的进行,政策发生变动,市场需求相对改变,企业本身的融资能力受限,加之某些政府官员进行权力寻租,各类风险开始出现,如果政府不能进行相对完善的风险分担管理,那么民营企业对PPP项目的参与决策开始改变,最终不利于PPP实践的成功,如果政府开始加强对项目中出现风险的科学管理,企业对PPP项目的参与度将提升。为了提高民营企业参与度,确保PPP项目实践在我国的成功,政府应在事前规划与项目实施中提供相对完善的风险分担管理。

In order to alleviate the pressure of government financial expenditure, enhance the vitality of socialcapital, and better meet the growing demand of the public for infrastructure and public services, PPP has been im-plemented and vigorously promoted in China. However, compared with the state-owned enterprises, the private en-terprises’ participation in PPP practice is relatively low and shows a downward trend. Private enterprises fail toshare the financial expenditure pressure of the national government departments, and the incentive effect of privateenterprises on market is not obvious, which is not consistent with the original intention of the promoting of PPPmode in China. The lack of participation of private enterprises in PPP projects is a key issue in China’s PPP re-form. By summarizing the literature, this paper holds that whether the government can carry out the management ofrisk sharing plays a decisive role in the participation of private enterprises in PPP projects. based on the evolution-ary game theory and the practical experience of PPP model in China, this paper establishes the evolutionary gamemodel to describe risk sharing management affecting private enterprises’ participation in PPP project decision-making, and deduces the strategic selection process of government departments and private enterprises. Throughthe evolutionary game analysis, this paper explains the formation mechanism of private enterprises’ enthusiasm re-duction for participating in PPP projects and the incentive measures for governance. The research shows that in theperiod of vigorously promoting PPP projects, private enterprises have a high degree of participation in PPP projectswith policy support and encouragement. However, with the development of PPP practice, policy changes, relativechanges in market demand, limited financing capacity of the enterprise, and power rent-seeking by some govern-ment officials, all kinds of risks begin to appear. If the government can not carry out relatively perfect risk sharingmanagement, then private enterprises’ participation in PPP project decision-making begins to change, which isnot good to the success of PPP practice. If the government starts to strengthen the scientific management of therisks in the project, the participation of enterprises in the PPP project will be enhanced. In order to improve theparticipation of private enterprises and ensure the success of PPP project practice in China, the government shouldprovide relatively perfect risk sharing management in advance planning and project implementation.