中国民营企业创新补贴政策效应的动态评价

Dynamic evaluation of the effect of innovation subsidy policy of Chinese private enterprises

选取民营制造企业样本,通过构建PVAR模型,动态分析政府补贴、创新数量与创新质量的互动关系,进而揭示中国民营制造企业政府创新补贴的激励效应和配置的合理性。结果表明:政府补贴对民营制造企业创新数量和创新质量均有滞后期为1-4年的促进作用,且对创新数量的促进效果更显著,说明补贴持续激励了企业创新产出的"量"与"质",但企业存在"重数量轻质量"的创新短视行为;反过来,创新数量和创新质量对政府补贴的后续投入强度分别具有滞后期为2-4年和1-4年的促进作用,且创新质量的促进作用更迅速、更显著,说明政府更注重参考企业创新质量的反馈情况。进一步研究发现,市场竞争积极影响了政府补贴与企业技术创新的互动关系,优化了"补贴投入——技术创新产出——后续补贴投入"的政企双向反馈链条,说明高市场竞争有利于创新补贴的高效使用和合理配置。研究结论可为政府补贴政策的顶层设计和民营制造企业的技术创新决策提供参考和借鉴。

Research on long-term and short-term dynamic interaction among government subsidies,innovation quantity and innovation quality,based on the panel data of listed private manufacturing enterprises in China with PVAR model,so as to reveal the incentive effect and allocation rationality of government innovation subsidies for private manufacturing enterprises in China.The results show that the government subsidies can promote the innovation quantity and quality in the lag period of 1-4 years,and the promotion effect on the innovation quantity is more significant,indicating that the subsidies continue to stimulate the progress of enterprises’innovation"quantity"and"quality",but there is short-sighted innovation behavior of"valuing quantity over quality"in enterprises.In turn,the quantity and quality of innovation also promote the subsequent investment intensity of government subsidies in the lag period of 2-4 years and 1-4 years respectively,and the promotion effect of innovation quality is faster and more significant,indicating that the government pays more attention to the feedback of innovation quality.Further research shows that market competition positively affects the interactive relationship between government subsidies and technological innovation of enterprises,and optimizes the two-way feedback chain of"subsidy input——technological innovation output——subsequent subsidy input",indicating that market competition promotes the efficient use and rational allocation of government subsidies.The research conclusion of this paper can provide reference for the top-level design of government subsidy policy and the technological innovation decision-making of private manufacturing enterprises.