基于公平偏好的排水权交易定价的非对称信息讨价还价模型

ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION BARGING MODEL BASED ON FAIRNESS-PREFERRED TRADE PRICING OF WATER DISCHARGING RIGHTS

为了保障排水权交易定价的公平合理性,促进排水权交易的有效实施,本文基于公平偏好理论构建了排水权交易定价的非对称信息讨价还价模型,运用逆向归纳法求解三阶段讨价还价的博弈均衡解,利用Matlab R2014a进行数值模拟,进一步分析了不同参数对最优定价和博弈效用的影响,结果显示:1)卖方愿意接受的最低补偿或买方愿意支付的最高补偿越高,最优报价越高;且买方愿意支付的最高补偿、卖方愿意接受的最低补偿增加幅度相等的情形下,前者使最优报价增加的幅度大于后者。公平偏好和贴现因子对不同博弈阶段的最优定价不产生直接影响。2)若卖方愿意接受的最低补偿越低且买方愿意支付的最高补偿越高,即谈判区间越大时,买卖双方能取得更高的博弈效用;买方(卖方)谈判贴现因子越大,买方(卖方)所获得的博弈效用越大。此外,若公平偏好维持一定水平,则随着贴现因子的增加,即使买方先行报价且双方保持收益增量相等,买方的整体效用水平也低于卖方博弈效用。

To protect the fairness of trade pricing of water discharging rights and to promote effective execution of water discharging right trade,this paper establishes an asymmetric information barging model based on fairness-preferred trade pricing of water discharging rights,which adopts reverse induction to solve three-staged barging gambling balance.Matlab R2014a is used to analyze the impacts of parameters on premier pricing and gambling effect.The higher acceptable lowest compensation price by seller is or highest compensation price by buyer is,the higher premier price is.If the highest compensation price by seller equals to the lowest acceptable compensation price by buyer in increment,the increased asking premier price by the former is larger than the latter.Fairness preference and discounting factor have little direction impacts on premier pricing at different gambling stages.The lower the lowest compensation price accepted by seller is or the higher the highest compensation price paid by buyer is,meaning a larger barging range,the higher the gambling effect will be made by both sides.The larger the barging discounting factor by both is,the larger gambling effect will be acquired by both.As discounting factor rises,if fairness preference maintained at a certain level,the buyer's whole gambling effect level is lower that the seller even if buyer asks price first and both maintain an equal earning increment.