蕴含主观业绩评价的教师激励契约设计——基于委托-代理理论的多案例研究

Teacher Incentive Contract Design with Subjective Performance Evaluation:A Multi-case Study Based on Principal-agent Theory

与奖惩资源结合的主观业绩评价是近来教师激励研究的一个新领域。从委托—代理理论视角切入,采用多案例研究方法,探索教师绩效工资制度下蕴含主观业绩评价的教师激励契约设计:主观业绩评价的应用程度、影响因素和有效性。研究发现:学校普遍使用客观业绩评价与主观业绩评价相结合的综合评价体系,且倾向于赋予客观业绩评价更高的权重;主观业绩评价的运用程度受内、外环境的约束,包括教育行政部门对学校工资分权程度、学校规模与发展阶段;学校评价者自身利益在薪酬分配中的技术安排影响主观业绩评价的有效性;主观业绩评价的主要成本来自领导偏好和教师讨好行为。

Subjective performance evaluation(SPE)combined with rewards and penalties is a new field of teacher incentive research in recent years.From the perspective of principal-agent theory,the study adopts the multi-case study approach to explore the teacher incentive contract design with subjective performance evaluation in teacher performance pay system,which includes the degree of application,the influencing factors and the effectiveness of SPE.It finds that the comprehensive evaluation system,which combines objective performance evaluation(OPE)with SPE,tends to give higher weight to OPE,that the degree of application of SPE is restricted by internal and external environments,including the degree of decentralization of school salary by the educational administrative department,the school scale and development stage,that the technical arrangement of the school evaluators’self-interest in the salary distribution affects the effectiveness of SPE,and that the main costs of SPE come from leaders’preference and teachers’ingratiating behavior.