跨界环境治理目标责任制的运行逻辑与治理绩效——以京津冀大气治理为例

The Running Logic and Governance Performance of the Target-Oriented Responsibility System for Cross-Regional Environmental Governance:A Case Study of the Air-Pollution Prevention and Treatment in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei

跨界情境具有高度复杂性且涉及多元主体,这给更擅长解决非跨界问题的传统目标责任制带来了新的挑战。以京津冀大气治理为例,分析目标责任制在面对跨界环境问题时,可发现其为实现跨界治理目标而在原有框架上的调整改进:在目标设置方面,聚焦公众关切的少数指标,采取渐进路径调整目标体系;在协同执行方面,确立政府的中心责任,强化属地行政动员,设立跨部门跨层级的协同机构及程序机制;在考核评估方面,优化监测技术,拓展信息源,调整激励机制,从而规避地方政府的策略性行为。通过上述制度设计,目标责任制使得京津冀大气治理在产出、结果、适应性三个层次上的绩效都有所提升,但也产生了考核指标覆盖面偏差、地方政府出于避责消极竞争、高强度考核带来博弈等非预期后果。

The cross-regional situation is highly complex and involves multiple subjects,which brings new challenges to the traditional target-oriented responsibility system that is better at solving non-cross-regional problems.When analyzing the target-oriented responsibility system is facing the cross-regional environmental problems from the case study of the air-pollution prevention and treatment in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei,this paper finds the adjustment and improvement based on the original framework to achieve the target of cross-regional governance:in terms of target setting,having focused on a few indicators that the public concerns and having taken a gradual approach to adjust the target system;in terms of coordinated implementation,having established the central responsibility of the government,having strengthened the territorial administrative mobilization,and having established the trans-department and trans-level coordinated institutions and procedural mechanisms;in terms of examination and assessment,having optimized the monitoring technology,having expanded the information source,and having adjusted the incentive system,in order to avoid the strategic behaviors of local government.Through the above system design,the target-oriented responsibility system has improved the performance of air-pollution prevention and treatment in Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei at three levels—output,result,and adaptation.However,there have been also some unexpected consequences,such as the deviation of the coverage of assessment indicators,the negative competition caused by local government’s avoiding responsibility,and the game brought by the high intensity of examination and assessment.