洛克是自然类的实在论者吗?

An exploration into John Locke’s thoughts on natural kinds

当代哲学家关于自然类的许多争论似乎都可以从洛克的思想中找到根源。洛克主张类语词指称的是人类心灵从个体事物中抽象出来的一般观念,而不是事物共同具有的客观内在结构。这种观点通常被解读为关于自然类的反本质主义和约定论,即自然类不是根据本质属性来定义的,并且不存在独立于心灵的自然类。一些学者从多元实在论和自我平衡属性簇的意义上来解释自然类,并认为洛克的自然类反本质主义立场可以与自然类实在论相容,但是这两种进路仍然存在困难。自然类不应当被视作独立于心灵,而洛克的观点可以被理解为承认自然类的心灵依赖性,并且依赖于心灵的自然类仍然拥有某种程度的实在性。

It seems that many debates over the nature of natural kinds among contemporary philosophers can trace back to John Locke, who claims that kind terms refer to general ideas abstracted from individual things by human minds, rather than objective internal structures shared by different things. This view is usually interpreted as anti-essentialism and conventionalism about natural kinds. That is to say, natural kinds are not defined by essential properties, and there are no natural kinds with mind independence. Some scholars expound natural kinds in terms of Plural Realism and HPC theory, and argue that Locke’s anti-essentialism of natural kinds could be compatible with natural kind realism. However, these two approaches still face difficulties. This paper attempts to argue that natural kinds do not have mind-independence, and that Locke’s views can be understood as admitting that natural kinds are mind-dependent, and natural kinds with mind-dependence possess certain degree of reality.