摘要
Fine(2016)给出了几种使真者语义学来解释我们如何理解我们的语言,但是它们是有争议的,特别在我们如何理解全称句子方面存在争议。在Hale未发表的论文中,Hale修正了严格使真者的语义学,来解释我们如何理解规律性的全称陈述句。在这篇文章中,我认为如果Hale坚持规律性的全称句子和偶然性的全称句子在严格使真者语义上的区分,那么最好区分这两种全称句子的逻辑形式,尽管前一种全称句子蕴涵后一种全称句子。我还给出了另一种规律性全称句子的语义条件来区于Hale所给出的语义条件。在文章的最后一部分,我在非严格的使真者语义学中比较了这两种规律性的全称句子的不同语义条件。
Fine(2016) provides some kinds of truth-maker semantics that explain how we understand our language, but these are controversial, especially in how we understand universal sentences. In his unpublished paper, Hale modifies Fine’s standard exact truth-maker semantics to explain how we understand law-like universal statements. In this paper, I suggest that if Hale insists that exact truth-maker semantics clauses for law-like universal statements differ from those for accidental universal statements, it would be better for Hale to formulate a lawlike generalization and an accidental generalization in different logical form, although the first entails the latter one. I also provide exact-truth-maker semantics for law-like generalization different from Hale’s. In the last part of this paper, locating universal statements in inexact truth-maker semantics, I compare the two formulations of the lawlike universal statements.
作者
许涤非
Difei Xu(School of Philosophy,Renmin University of China)
出处
《逻辑学研究》
CSSCI
2020年第3期19-31,共13页
Studies in Logic
基金
supported by Renmin University of China’s 2019 Fund for Building World-Class Universities(Disciplines).
