康德论依附美:概念基础上的感性判断

Kant on Adherent Beauty:Conceptually-based Aesthetic Judgment

在《判断力批判》中,康德一方面强调审美判断的感性、无概念特质,一方面却提出不同于自由美的所谓“依附美”,即,依附于对象的概念及相应完善性的美。概念基础上的感性判断如何可能?康德是否自相矛盾?中外学界众说纷纭:“外在说”保持了鉴赏的纯粹感性,却无法解释其对概念的依赖;“内在说”解释了这种依赖,却使依附美判断直接包含完善性判断,从而无法成为一种感性判断。本文主张:想象力可在完善性认识中获得图型,并在审美鉴赏中仅仅按照图型与知性自由游戏,从而形成依附美判断。想象力既要按照图型(而非概念)去表象客体的部分特征,又不按图型、任意表象客体中不对应于图型的另一些特征。那些对应于图型的特征,本身只是完善的、而非美的;那些不对应于图型的特征,本身既不完善、往往也不美;但是,将两者一起表象时,想象力却可能与知性“相互激活”。这种判断一方面是反思性(而非规定性)的,另一方面通过图型而依赖概念。于是,依附美既是感性的,又间接地以概念为基础;既有别于完善性,又有别于自由美,可谓一种特殊的美。其中,概念虽积极影响、但不直接规定鉴赏活动。如此诠释下的“依附美”学说,不但本身具有说服力,还能为形式主义艺术论提供新的反思框架。

In the Critique of the Power of Judgment,Kant underscores the aesthetic,non-conceptual characteristic of the judgment of taste,and yet proposes the so-called“adherent beauty,”which,in contrast to free beauty,adherent to an object's concept and to its corresponding perfection.How is a conceptually-based aesthetic judgment possible?Is Kant's theory inconsistent?None of the available readings can be satisfactory:on an“external”approach,adherent beauty is indeed aesthetic but cannot possibly depend on concepts.By contrast,on an“internal”approach,adherent beauty immediately depends on concepts and,therefore,cannot be aesthetic.To resolve the controversy,this paper argues:our imagination may acquire a schema in a conceptual judgment,and then freely play with the understanding according to the schema in a judgment of adherent beauty,which is aesthetic but indirectly dependent on a concept via the schema.The object's features corresponding to the schema are not beautiful in their own rights but,together with the remaining features,may bring harmony to our cognitive faculties in their representation.As such,adherent beauty is a unique type of phenomenon,clearly distinguished from both perfection and free beauty.On this interpretation,Kant's theory of adherent beauty can be convincing in itself while shedding light on artistic formalism.