自愿参与机制下的公共物品博弈与合作演化

Public goods game under voluntary participation mechanism and the evolution of cooperation

在自愿参与机制下,采用多维马尔科夫过程对随机演化公共物品博弈中系统的状态进行建模.利用马氏过程的极限分布研究了随机系统的均衡和群体合作行为.将结果与确定性复制动态模型进行了对比.研究发现,强度趋于零的随机性会改变系统的演化行为,相同的博弈参数下两类系统表现出不同的演化结果;对于随机系统,较小的投资收益系数和固定收益即能有效阻止背叛策略的复制,较大的投资收益系数和固定收益即能有效促进合作策略的复制.总体上,随机系统更有利于群体合作的演化.

This paper studies stochastic evolutionary public goods games under the voluntary participation mechanism.It uses a multi-dimensional Markov process to describe the state of the system.The equilibria of the stochastic system and the cooperation behavior of the population are analyzed based on the limit distribution of the Markov process.The results are compared to the deterministic replication dynamic model in an infinite population.The study finds that even the randomness whose intensity tends to be zero can change the evolution behavior of the system.Under the same game parameters,the two types of systems show different evolutionary results.For the stochastic system,a small investment return and fixed income coefficient can effectively prevent the reproduction of defection,and a large investment return and fixed income coefficient can promote the reproduction of cooperation.The stochastic system is more conducive to the evolution of cooperation.