摘要
为探讨结合网上拍卖特征的投标决策问题,基于独立私有价值模型,运用博弈理论从卖家的角度求解了eBay拍卖中投标者的赢标概率和期望收入.研究发现,早期抢标在一定程度上会削弱末尾抢标在拍卖中的影响,在考虑投标过程的决策模型中,以非齐次泊松过程近似投标者到达过程更为合理.当投标者以自身估值向下递减投标达到次高投标价时,获得的期望收入最大.
The bidders’winning probability and expected income in the eBay auction are modeled and solved within the independent private values(IPV)paradigm and game theory to study bidding strategies considering the characteristics of online auctions from the seller’s perspective.The results show that the early bidding which can water down the emotion of the deadline bidding for online auctions to a certain extent.It is found that the non-homogeneous poisson process approximates the bidders’arrival process is reasonable in decisionmaking model with regard to bidding procedure.Moreover,when reducing the bid to reach the second highest one based on one’s own valuation,the bidder will acquire the largest expected income.
作者
陈绍刚
戴曾罡
Chen Shaogang;Dai Zenggang(School of Mathematical Sciences,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 611731,China)
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2020年第2期201-209,共9页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71772025,71873022).
关键词
网上拍卖
投标
非齐次泊松过程
期望收入
online auction
bidding
non-homogeneous poisson process
expecting income
