建筑工程质量监管的多周期声誉效应模型

Multi-period Reputation Effect Model for Quality Supervision of Construction Engineering

【目的/意义】当前我国建筑业进入存量竞争时代,尽管国家不断提高监管水平,但重压之下因施工企业违规操作而导致的建筑安全悲剧仍然频繁发生。如何提高建筑质量监管效果成为学界关注的热点。【设计/方法】考虑招投标阶段业主与施工企业之间关于施工质量的信息不对称,以及声誉效应对施工企业市场行为的约束作用,建立了多周期声誉效应模型。分别对“散兵游击”式的散杂包工队和重视声誉效应约束的正规企业进行博弈分析。最后以绵阳盘江大桥垮塌事件为案例,对理论结果加以验证。【结论/发现】在不考虑多周期声誉效应条件下,当对施工企业的违规处罚小于其违规所获“超额利润”时,单独依靠加大监管力度无法约束施工企业的市场行为,监管失灵。在考虑声誉效应条件下,施工方“偷工减料”行为会导致未来期收益降低,起到了规范市场行为的作用。

[Purpose/Significance]At present,China's construction industry has entered an era of stock competition.Despite the continuous improvement of the country's supervision level,construction safety tragedies caused by illegal operation of construction companies under heavy pressure still occur frequently.How to improve the effect of building quality supervision has become a hotspot in academic circles.[Design/Methodology]This paper considers the information asymmetry between the owner and the construction company about the construction quality at the bidding stage and the constraint effect of reputation effect on the market behavior of the construction company,and establishes a multi-period reputation effect model.The game analysis is carried out on the loose-contract work team and the regular enterprises that attach importance to the restriction of reputation effect.Finally,taking the collapse of the Mianyang Panjiang Bridge as an example,the theoretical results are verified.[Findings/Conclusions]Without considering the multi-period reputation effect,when the penalties for noncompliance of construction enterprises are less than the"excess profits"obtained from the violations,the market behavior of construction enterprises cannot be restrained by supervision alone,and the supervision fails.Considering the reputation effect,the construction party's"stealing and cutting materials"behavior will lead to a decrease in future earnings,which plays a role in regulating market behavior.