指示性概念与再识别条件

Demonstrative Concept and Re-Identification

在知觉体验内容是概念性的还是非概念性的这场争论中,概念论者通常用指示性概念策略来回应非概念论者提出的基于知觉体验的精细性论证的反驳。一些哲学家质疑这一策略,认为指示性概念并非一个真正的概念,他们的一个重要理由是指示性概念不能满足再识别条件。一些哲学家通过否认指示性概念必须满足再识别条件来保卫指示性概念策略。文章试图表明,否认指示性概念应当满足历时可辨识条件,虽然可以逃脱非概念论者的反驳,但会损害概念论最初的目标,即解释知觉体验为何具有认识上的辩护作用。

In the debate over whether the content of perceptual experience is conceptual or non-conceptual, conceptualism proposes the strategy of demonstrative concepts in response to refute the fine-grained argument that are advanced by non-conceptualism. Some philosophers doubted the strategy, they thought that demonstrative concepts is not a real concept. One of the most important reason is their demonstrative concepts cannot satisfy the re-identification condition. Other philosophers defend the demonstrative concepts strategy by denying that reason. According to the two dimensions of discrimination ability or recognition ability, synchronic or diachronic, this paper distinguishes four cases of re-identification condition, and clarifies that the focus of debate among these philosophers is whether the indicative concepts should satisfy the diachronic identification condition. This paper attempts to show that the demonstrative concepts without the diachronic identifiable condition can avoid the rebuttal of the non-conceptualism. But it goes against the original goal of conceptualism, that is, to explain why perceptual experience serves as a cognitive justification.