考虑政府补贴的环保托盘租赁供应链协调优化

Coordination and Optimization of Environmental Pallet Leasing Supply Chain with Government Subsidies

在考虑环保托盘的绿色度、政府对制造商和企业的补贴等因素的基础上,建立了一个以托盘制造商为主导者,第三方托盘商为跟随者的二级供应链Stackelberg博弈模型,采用报童模型研究了在需求不确定下,基于收益共享契约的环保托盘租赁供应链收益协调问题。结果表明,在任何情况下,集中决策总是优于分散决策;制造商提高环保托盘的绿色度可以增大供应链各方的收益;相较对制造商进行补贴,政府对企业租赁价格的补贴将更有利于供应链协调;同时在此收益共享契约下,供应链上各参与者可以找到较优收益分配率使整个系统达到帕累托最优;数值算例验证了相关结论及契约的有效性。

Considering the greenness of environmental pallets and government subsidies to manufacturers and enterprises,a Stackelberg game model of secondary supply chain with pallet manufacturers as the dominant and third-party pallet leasers as followers was established. Under uncertain demand and revenue sharing contract,the newsvendor model was used to study the revenue coordination of environmental pallet leasing supply chain.The results show that centralized decisionmaking is always better than decentralized decision-making under any circumstances;manufacturers can increase the benefits of all parties in the supply chain by improving the greenness of environmental pallets;government subsidies for rental prices of enterprises will be more conducive to supply chain coordination than subsidies for manufacturers;at the same time,under this revenue-sharing contract,the participants in the supply chain can find a better income distribution rate to make the whole system reach Pareto optimum. The numerical examples verify the validity of the relevant conclusions and contracts.