高管薪酬激励、管理者权力与债券融资成本

The Impact of Executive Compensation Incentive and Manager Power on Bond Financing Cost

文章选取了2015-2019年沪深A股上市公司共11867个样本量的面板数据作为研究对象,分析了在不同产权下不同的高管薪酬激励对债券融资成本的影响作用,并进一步研究管理者权力对于它们关系的调节作用。研究表明,在国企公司中,高管货币薪酬激励与债券融资成本负相关关系;高管股权薪酬激励与债券融资成本正相关关系,且管理者权力对其正向关系具有反向调节作用。

The paper selects 11,867 samples of Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2019 as research objects,analyzes the influence of different executive compensation incentives on bond financing costs under different property rights,and further studies the regulatory role of managers'power on their relations.The research shows that in state-owned enterprises,monetary compensation incentive for executives is negatively correlated with bond financing cost.There is a positive correlation between executive equity compensation incentive and bond financing cost,and managers'power has a negative regulating effect on the positive correlation.