审计定价管制与交易剩余——2010年审计定价管制失效的自然实验

Audit Pricing Regulation and Transaction Surplus——The Natural Experiment of the Unsuccessful Audit Pricing Regulation in 2010

在经济下行压力加大、资本市场进一步开放的新形势下,厘清审计市场交易——监管机制,完善审计服务市场尤为必要。借由2010年审计定价管制政策失效的自然实验,本文通过嵌入双边随机边界模型,得到审计双方的定价交易剩余指标,运用双重差分模型解析价格管制与交易定价的作用机制。研究发现,定价管制失效的原因不在于规制俘获,而在于价格管制与当前的市场效率不匹配。下限管制尽管能够提高审计师剩余,但同时会放大交易定价风险,增加剩余的错配,扰乱交易秩序。上限管制则进一步固化市场的低价竞争。进一步研究发现审计师剩余与盈余质量显著相关,2014年的放开定价管制政策提高了审计师剩余。研究厘清了审计市场交易机制,有利于未来研究审计交易机制的微观影响及与盈余质量的关联,为在新时代把握审计市场交易——监管规律、培育自发良性交易的审计市场提供有益借鉴。

Under the new situation of increasing economic downward pressure and further opening of the capital market,it is particularly necessary to clarify the transaction-supervision mechanism of the audit market to improve the audit service market. Based on the natural experiment of the unsuccessful audit pricing regulation policy in 2010 with the Two-tier Stochastic Frontier Model to obtain transaction surplus indicators of both parties of the audit pricing,this paper uses difference-in-difference model to analyze the function of price regulation on transaction pricing. We find that the failure cannot be attributed to regulation capture but to the mismatch between the regulation and current market effectiveness. Although a lowest-price regulation can improve auditor surplus,it expands the pricing risk,adds the mismatch of surplus,and disturbs the transaction order at the same time. Highest-price regulation can further worsen the low-price competition. Further study shows that auditor surplus is significantly correlated with surplus quality,and the price-deregulation policy in 2014 improves auditor surplus. This paper clarifies the audit market transaction mechanism,helps further research into the micro-effect of audit transaction mechanism and correlation with surplus quality,and provides a useful reference for grasping the transaction-supervision rules of audit market and cultivating spontaneous and benign audit transaction market in the new economic situation.