融资成本如何制约“清理效应”:市场摩擦还是政策扭曲——基于中国制造业企业退出行为的研究

Financing Cost Burden on Cleansing Effect:Market Friction or Policy Distortion?Empirical Evidence from Exit Behavior of Chinese Manufacturing Firms

在经济下行期,通过清除低效率企业及生产模式,市场具有改进资源配置效率的"清理效应",但可能受制于市场性摩擦或政策性扭曲而无法充分实现。本文基于企业退出行为,考察了中国制造业企业融资成本对"清理效应"的制约机制。实证分析表明,融资成本显著扭曲了"企业生产率—退出概率"关系,且其影响显著地集中于经济下行期,从而抑制了下行期的资源配置效率改进。通过将融资成本差异分解为禀赋差异引起的部分和所有制歧视驱动的部分,发现融资成本的扭曲作用主要体在由禀赋差异主导融资成本差异的样本中,即市场性摩擦而不是政策性扭曲制约了市场的"清理效应"。

Economic downturn contains the mechanism of Cleansing Effect to improve the resource allocation.However,either market friction or policy distortion may suppress it.This paper analyzes how the financing cost of Chinese manufacturing firms restrain Cleansing Effect,through the extensive margin of firm exit.The result of empirical analysis shows that financing cost significantly distorts firms'productivity-exit probability connection,and the distortion effect mainly concentrates in the period of economic downturns,suppressing the opportunity of improving resource allocation.The mechanism analysis shows that the difference of financing cost arising from the difference of firms' ownership can explain the effect of financing cost,the main mechanism of which comes from market friction instead of policy distortion.