过度自信对原制造商与第三方再制造商产量竞争的影响研究

The Impact of Overconfidence on Quantity Competition Between Original Equipment Manufacturer and Third-party Remanufacturer

运用Stackelberg博弈理论探究了原制造商与第三方再制造商的产量竞争问题,推导和比较了再制造商对随机再制造产率的认知完全理性、过度精确以及同时过高估计和过度精确三种情形下的博弈均衡解和利润,进而分析过度自信程度和再制造产率离散系数平方的影响。研究结果表明,三种情形下再制造产率离散系数平方的增加均将使再制造商利润降低,相反原制造商利润提高;再制造商过度精确情形下过度自信程度的增加将使原制造商利润受损,而在双重过度自信情形下原制造商可能从再制造商的过度自信中获益;再制造商的过度精确对原制造商最为不利,而再制造商保持完全理性对自身最优。

The quantity competition problem between an original equipment manufacturer(OEM)and a third-party remanufacturer was investigated based on Stackelberg game theory.The game equilibrium and both parties’profits were derived and compared under three cases:the remanufacturers'perception of random remanufacturing yield is completely rational,overprecision,or both over-estimated and overprecision.Then the impacts of the remanufacturer’s overconfidence degree and dispersion coefficient square of remanufacturing yield were analyzed.The results show that the increase of the dispersion coefficient square of remanufacturing yield reduces the remanufacturer’s profit but increases the OEM’s profit in all three cases.The increase of the remanufacturer's overconfidence degree in the overprecision case hurted the OEM’s profits,while the OEM might benefit from the remanufacturer’s overconfidence in the dual overconfidence case.The remanufacturer's overprecision was most detrimental to the OEM,and complete rationality was the optimal choice for the remanufacturer.