军民融合协同创新技术的随机微分博弈研究

Research on the Cooperative Innovation Technology of Military and Civilian Fusion Based on Stochastic Differential Game

在军民融合协同创新体系中考虑随机因素干扰的影响,建立随机微分博弈模型,研究了Nash非合作博弈,Stackelberg博弈和协同合作博弈下体系达到均衡状态时决策主体的共享策略和最优收益、体系技术水平的期望值和方差。研究结果表明,技术共享的努力程度与技术创新影响系数、企业边际收益成正比,与技术共享成本和衰减系数成反比。协同创新体系技术水平的期望值和方差及其稳定值、体系的总收益在协同合作博弈时最大,Stackelberg博弈时次之,Nash非合作博弈时最小。

In the military-civilian fusion collaborative innovation system,the influence of random factors is considered,and a stochastic differential game model is established to study the Nash non-cooperative game,Stackelberg game and Cooperative game.The decision-maker's sharing strategy,optimal returns,and system technology level expectations and variances under the equilibrium state is also considered.It is found that the degree of technology sharing effort is directly proportional to the impact coefficient of technological innovation and the marginal revenue of the company,and inversely proportional to the cost of technology sharing and the attenuation coefficient.The expected value and variance of the technological level of the collaborative innovation system,its stability value,and the total return of the system are the largest in the cooperative game,the Stackelberg game is the second,and the Nash non-cooperative game is the smallest.