摘要
建立综合考虑产品价格、服务水平及市场权力结构的E-闭环供应链决策博弈模型,在3种闭环供应链决策模式下探讨供应链服务水平决策、制造商线上渠道选择问题。研究表明,E-闭环供应链中服务水平投入存在阈值,唯有当服务水平小于阈值时,提高服务水平才有助于增加企业利润;制造商选择参与E-闭环供应链优于参与传统供应链;实力较强的制造商选择与平台电商合作对其更有利,反之与零售电商合作更有利。
By establishing the E-closed-loop supply chain decision game models that comprehensively consider the product price,service level and market power structure,this paper discusses decision-making concerning the optimal service level of supply chain and manufacturers’online channel selection under three decision-making scenarios.The research shows that there is a threshold value in terms of service level input in E-closed-loop supply chain.Only when the service level is lower than the threshold value,will improving the service level help increase the profits of enterprises;Manufacturers prefer to participate in E-closed-loop supply chain rather than traditional supply chain;Strong manufacturers should choose to cooperate with platform e-commerce for their own benefit,otherwise it is more favorable to cooperate with retail e-commerce.
作者
田源
杨莹
TIAN Yuan;YANG Ying(School of Economics and Management,Beijing Jiaotong University,Beijing 100044,China)
出处
《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2020年第3期108-120,共13页
Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词
E-闭环供应链
服务水平
博弈
决策
E-closed-loop supply chain
service level
game
decision-making