摘要
康韦和寇辰在论证自由意志定理的时候,未加反思地接受了西方主流学界有关自由与必然的二元对立架构,尤其忽视了围观粒子不像人那样拥有自觉心理中的意欲愿望这个关键的事实,结果将人们随意任性的应然性价值诉求与粒子随机偶然的实然性存在状态混为了一谈,在种种逻辑谬误和自相矛盾中得出了微观粒子乃至整个宇宙都像人一样拥有自由意志的扭曲结论。
In their arguments for the free will theorem,John Conway and Simon Kochen unreflectively accept the dichotomy between freedom and necessity set up by the mainstream Western philosophy,and especially ignore the key fact that particles do not have the conscious psychological will or desire as humans do.As a result,they confuse the intentional value claims of humans with the random factual status of particles,and draw from a series of logical fallacies and self-contradictions the distorted conclusion that microscopic particles and even the entire universe have free will like humans.
作者
刘清平
LIU Qing-ping(Fudan Institute of Advanced Study in Social Sciences,Fudan University,Shanghai 200433,China;School of Humanities,Wuhan College of Communication,Wuhan 430205,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期1-8,共8页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology