中国地方债务缘何隐性扩张——基于隐性金融分权的视角

Reasons for the Implicit Expansion of China’s Local Debts: From the Perspective of Implicit Financial Decentralization

隐性债务风险之险,恰在于"隐",是地方政府利用隐性金融分权扩张债务的结果。隐性金融分权之"隐",体现在中央统一规范的金融制度安排之外,地方政府之间就金融资源的配置权和控制权进行自主划定与分配的一系列非规范的隐性金融制度安排,是促成地方债务非理性扩张的重要途径。地方政府借助地方金融机构、融资平台、影子银行、PPP项目、国有企业等可控平台,通过城投债、政府购买服务、融资租赁以及其他非标融资方式等途径进行举债融资而形成与地方政府相关联的债务,是激励约束机制不平衡下各利益主体大肆获取经济利益的结果。因此,为了防止地方债务非理性扩张,不仅要做好地方政府的财政和政治激励,更要理顺中央与地方之间的金融关系,做好金融监管,实现隐性金融分权向市场化金融集权转变。

The risk of implicit debt lies in the"implicitness",wh ich is the result of the local governments’use of hidden financial decentralization to expand the debt.The implicitness of the implicit financial decentralization is reflected outside of the unified and standardized financial system arranged by the central government;a series of non-standard implicit financial system arrangements among local governments for the independent delineation and distribution of the allocation and the control rights of financial resources are important ways to promote the irrational expansion of local debts.With the help of local financial institutions,financing platforms,the PPP projects,shadow banking,state-owned enterprises and other controllable platforms,local governments conduct debt financing via urban construction investment debts,purchasing services by governments,financial leasing and other non-standard financing ways,thus debts are formed that is related to the local governments,which is the result of each interest subject gaining economic interests wantonly under the imbalanced incentive and constraint mechanism.Therefore,in order to prevent the irrational expansion of local debts,it is necessary not only to do a good job in the fiscal and political incentives of local governments,but also to straighten out the financial relationship between the central and local governments.And financial supervision should be carried out well,so as to promote the transformation from implicit financial decentralization to marketized financial centralization.