在职消费、过度投资与国有企业创新投入

Perks, Over-investment and State-owned Enterprise Innovation Investment

文章结合中国实施创新驱动发展战略及国有企业“限薪令”的现实背景,考察了高管在职消费强度对国有企业创新投入的影响及其机制。研究发现:(1)在职消费强度、异常在职消费强度对国有企业创新投入存在一定的积极作用;(2)与民营企业不同,因国有企业承担众多政府任务而明显存在过度投资,国有企业在职消费强度的提高对过度投资产生负向影响,为企业争取了更多创新资源,进而对创新投入产生正向影响。

This paper examines the impact of executives'perks intensity on state-owned enterprises'innovation investment and its influence mechanism in the light of the realistic background of China's implementation of the innovation-driven development strategy and the“salary limit order”of state-owned enterprises.The findings of the study are as follows:(1)The perks intensity and the abnormal perks intensity have positive influence on the innovation investment of state-owned enterprises;(2)Unlike private companies,state-owned enterprises are assigned a lot of government tasks,which leads to apparent over-investment.Therefore,the increase of state-owned enterprises'perks intensity has a negative impact on over-investment,which helps them gain more innovative resources and has a positive impact on the innovation investment.