不同环境规制下基于微分博弈的供应链低碳协调策略研究

Research on Low Carbon Coordination Strategy of Supply Chain Based on Differential Game under Different Environmental Regulations

针对制造商及零售商的低碳行为,建立微分博弈模型,研究市场、政府和供应链三种环境规制下成员的最优策略。结果表明:不同环境规制下,制造商低碳投入、零售商促销努力及双方所得利润之间存在差异,且以供应链为基础时可实现最大化。进一步通过灵敏度分析,得出不同环境规制下,产品绿色度、商誉及成员利润都随时间的推移显著增加但增加速率不同;不同环境规制比较下,政府及制造商补贴都能促进成员利润的增加,但其差异增加速率不同。说明政府及制造商补贴分别在不同环境规制下起作用,因此,政府环境规制下制造商应做出更大的低碳投入努力,而供应链环境规制下零售商需做出更大的促销努力。

This paper aims at the low-carbon behavior of manufacturers and retailers,establishes a differential game model,and studies the optimal strategies of members under the three environmental regulations of market,government and supply chain.The results show that:under different environmental regulations,there are differences between manufacturers’ low-carbon investment,retailers’ promotion efforts and their profits,which can be maximized based on the supply chain.Further through sensitivity analysis,it is concluded that under different environmental regulations,product greenness,goodwill and member profits all increase significantly with the passage of time,but at different rates.Under different environmental regulations,government and manufacturer subsidies can both promote the increase of members’ profits,but the rate of difference is different.It shows that government and manufacturer subsidies play a role under different environmental regulations,so manufacturers should make greater efforts in low-carbon investment under government environmental regulations,while retailers should make greater efforts in promotion under supply chain environmental regulations.