高管薪酬激励、银行关联与企业资本结构偏离——来自A股上市公司的证据

Executive Compensation Incentive,Bank Associations and Corporate Capital Structure Deviation:Evidence from A Share Listed Companies

本文选取A股上市公司数据研究高管薪酬激励对企业资本结构偏离的影响及其调节作用。研究表明,高管薪酬激励水平的提高会降低企业资本结构与其目标资本结构的偏离度,促使企业资本结构向目标资本结构的方向调整。与负债过度的企业相比,高管薪酬激励对负债不足企业资本结构偏离的抑制力度更大。此外,对调节作用的进一步检验表明,银行关联程度的提高会加剧高管薪酬激励对资本结构偏离的抑制作用,且呈现非对称性。当企业负债不足时,高管利用银行关联带来的融资便利来加大企业债务杠杆,促使资本结构向上调整而偏离度缩窄;当企业负债过度时,融资约束引发高管债务资本惜售倾向,高管利用银行关联进行贷款展期,从而导致企业资本结构无法向下调整而偏离度缩窄。

This paper empirically analyzes the influence of executive compensation incentives on the deviation of corporate capital structure and the associated adjustment effect by using a sample of A share listed companies.This research shows that the improvement of executive compensation incentives will reduce the deviation of corporate capital structure from its target,and promote the adjustment of corporate capital structure.Compared with overly indebted companies,executive compensation incentives have a stronger restraint on capital structure deviations of less indebted companies.Bank associations will exacerbate restraining effect of executive compensation incentives on capital structure deviations,and the regulatory role of bank associations is asymmetric.When corporate debt is insufficient,executives take advantage of financing convenience brought by bank associations to increase debt leverage,prompting capital structure to adjust upwards and narrowing the deviation.When corporate debt is excessive,motivation for financing constraints causes the psychology of debt capital reluctance,which urges executives to use bank associations to repay loans,which will lead to the inability of downward adjustments of capital structure and narrowing the deviation.