摘要
2015年实施的《新预算法》,在法律上明确了政府和城投公司的界限,剥离了政府对城投债的隐性担保预期,使城投债的风险定位与之前有了本质的区别,市场投资者的"城投信仰"遭到挑战。本文对2009年到2018年发行的5 925个城投债样本进行了实证检验,来研究在城投债存在政府隐性担保的情况下,使用显性增信措施能否降低发行信用利差,并依据研究结论提出一些建议。
The new budget law implemented in 2015 legally distinguishes the boundaries between the government and the local government financing platforms(LGFP),so the risk positioning of urban construction investment bonds(UCIB) is essentially different from that before,and the implicit government guarantees belief of market investors is challenged.This essay carried out the descriptive statistics and regression analysis with a sample of 5 925 UCIBs issued between 2009 and 2018 to figure out whether explicit credit enhancement measures has a significant impact on reducing the credit spread where there is already government implicit guarantee.Based on the research conclusions,this paper puts forward some opinions and suggestions from different angles.
作者
冒宛宜
MAO Wanyi(Sealand Securities CO.,LTD.,Shanghai 200001,China)
出处
《上海商学院学报》
2020年第3期90-108,共19页
Business Economic Review
关键词
城投债
显性增信措施
政府隐性担保
发行信用利差
urban construction investment bonds
explicit credit enhancement measures
implicit government guarantee
credit spread
