摘要
以中国资本市场开放试点项目--"沪港通"为外生事件,运用多期双重差分模型,考察资本市场开放对上市公司高管薪酬契约有效性的影响,并进一步考察这种影响在不同产权公司中的差异。研究发现:"沪港通"的开启能够显著提升高管薪酬的业绩敏感性;相较于民营企业,"沪港通"的开启对国有企业高管薪酬的业绩敏感性的促进作用更为显著;对于股权相对较为分散以及地处市场化程度较高地区的上市公司,"沪港通"的开启对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的正向效应更强。
Taking the pilot project of China’s capital market liberalization"Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect"as an exogenous event,with the multi-period difference-in-difference model,this paper examines the influence of capital market liberalization on the effectiveness of listed companies’ executive compensation contracts,and further examines potential differences of such influence in firms with different nature of property rights.The study finds that the opening of "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect" can significantly increase pay-for-performance sensitivity;compared with private enterprises,it has a more significant effect on that in state-owned enterprises.The positive effect of the opening of the "Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect"on the pay-for-performance sensitivity is more pronounced in listed companies with relatively dispersed equity and in the regions with a high degree of marketization.
作者
孙诗璐
汪文生
SUN Shilu;WANG Wensheng(Business School,University of International Business and Economics,Beijing 100029;School of Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Beijing 100083)
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“新常态下我国煤炭行业去过剩产能及政策选择问题研究”(16BJY054)。
关键词
资本市场开放
“沪港通”
薪酬业绩敏感性
公司治理
Stock Market Liberalization
"Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect"
Pay-for-performance Sensitivity
Corporate Governance
