摘要
车险市场长期受到道德风险与逆向选择的困扰。车载数据采集装置可以收集大量有关驾驶员驾驶行为与风险因素的信息,保险公司可基于驾驶行为与风险因子设定动态保费,从而缓解道德风险问题。同时,保险公司可根据观察到的风险因子减轻逆向选择问题。利用最优控制理论分析车联网背景下驾驶员与保险公司的最优决策,研究发现相比于传统车险产品,车联网保险能够在提高保险受益的情况下获取更大的市场份额,并有效诱导不同类型的投保驾驶员谨慎驾驶,从而提高社会交通安全福利。
Vehicle insurance market has been chronically plagued by moral hazard and adverse selection problems.Vehicle-implemented devices can collect massive data containing information revealing driving behavior and risk factors,thus allowing firms to dynamically set premium based on information acquired and alleviate both the moral hazard and adverse selection problems.In this paper,an optimal control approach is proposed to analyze optimal decisions for both drivers and firms under Internet of Things setting.Analysis shows that vehicle insurances based on Internet of Things can cover a larger market share and therefore guarantee higher profit in comparison to traditional vehicle insurances.In addition,Internet of Things vehicle insurances can induce drivers of different types to exert efforts at efficient levels and therefore raise the social traffic safety.
作者
亢男
蒋炜
KANG Nan;JIANG Wei(Antai School of Ecomomics and Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China)
出处
《上海管理科学》
2020年第4期34-41,共8页
Shanghai Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点项目“基于物联网的产品状态智能监控与质量管理”(71531010)。
关键词
车联网保险
道德风险
逆向选择
最优控制
合同设计
internet of things vehicle insurance
moral hazard
adverse selection
optimal control
contract design