企业集群产品质量监管演化与仿真研究

The Evolution and Simulation of Product Quality Supervision in Enterprise Clusters

产品质量造假屡禁不止,如何在有限监管资源下对大量企业的产品质量有效监管是质量监管部门面临的难题。不同于实际操作中按照企业规模(大中小各占一定比例)制定监督抽查方案,本文提出在企业集群演化视角制定监管策略,分别研究了免检与全检、企业整群抽检和企业分层抽检四种不同抽检策略下的企业集群演化规律。研究发现:采取免检时,质量处罚仅是不可信威胁导致"监管失灵",企业集群均演化到质量造假;采取全检时,企业集群演化取决于质量处罚能否完全覆盖质量造假成本缩减;在企业整群抽检和企业分层抽检策略下,分别得到质量处罚与抽检概率的提升路径及对应的企业集群演化路径,若想使企业集群均演化到标准质量,需参照企业集群中最大的成本缩减和竞争收益设置质量处罚,处罚越低所需的抽检概率就越高,企业分层抽检可以降低企业集群演化到标准质量所需的整体抽检概率。

The product quality fraud emerges in endlessly,quality supervision departments have to face the challenge of how to supervise the quality of a large number of enterprises’products.Different from making sampling plan by enterprise-scale(small medium and large according to certain ratio respectively),a supervision model of enterprise clusters supervision is proposed then the sampling strategy and punishment mechanism are discussed.The product quality evolution of enterprise clusters is also analyzed in four sampling strategy,namely free sampling,full sampling,global cluster sampling and stratified cluster sampling.In free sampling,quality punishment not be credible with the emergence of"regulation failure",all the enterprise clusters evolve to quality fraud strategy;In full sampling,the evolution of enterprise clusters depends on whether quality punishment cover cost reducing in quality fraud;In global cluster sampling and stratified cluster sampling,the ascension path of quality punishment and sampling probability is gotten besides enterprise clusters evolution path,the enterprise clusters evolve to standard quality when quality punishment according to the maximal cost reducing and competitive profit,the lower the quality punishment,the higher the sampling probability,the stratified cluster sampling can reduce the overall sampling probability.Our work provides theoretical support and decision reference for product quality supervision model.The enterprise clusters supervision model is hoped to play a role in practice of product quality supervision.