韦伯官僚建制理论与腐败问题研究

Weberian Bureaucracy and Corruption

本文探讨公务员体制同腐败的关系。根据经济学激励机制模型和马克思·韦伯的“理性化官僚体制”理论提出了提高公务员理性化程度的三个体制:(1)唯才录用制度;(2)高薪制度;(3)严格的法治监管制度。本文以跨国数据回归统计研究方式,研究该三项公务员体制对腐败的影响程度。最后,根据统计研究的结果,提出对中国公务员机制改革的相关建议。

This article intends to solve the corruption problem from bureaucratic institutional design.Based on an economic modeling and Max Weber's idea about Rational Bureaucracy,we draw out three institutions for a Weberian Bureaucracy:(1)a merit-based recruitment system;(2)comparable payment between the public and private sector;and(3)an effective supervision system.We use across national data analysis to test the causal relations between the above three institutional variables and corruption.The research result shows a significant relationship between the above Weberian institutional variables and corruption.We also provide suggestions for Chinese civil service system based on the research result.