表里相济:财政补贴与股权激励在促进企业创新中的协同效应

Mutual Complementary:The Synergy Effect of Fiscal Subsidy and Equity Incentive in Promoting Enterprise Innovation

运用财政补贴政策促进企业创新时,既可能出现财政补贴分配前的逆向选择问题,也可能出现财政补贴分配后的道德风险问题。本文认为,“表里相济”才能更好地促进企业创新,即财政补贴政策作为一种激励企业创新的外部机制,必须有企业内部机制的协同配合才能更好地发挥作用。以中国A股市场上市公司为样本,本文发现,当企业内部存在股权激励以及股权激励在高管激励结构中的比重较高时,财政补贴更能促进企业提高研发投入。这些结果在排除反向因果关系、样本选择偏误后依然成立。本文最后从创新产出、人才集聚效应、全要素生产率以及企业价值等方面,检验了高管股权激励作为财政补贴协同机制所产生的积极后果,结果表明,股权激励对财政补贴能起到实质性的协同效应。

When the fiscal subsidy policy is used to promote enterprise innovation,there may be both the problem of adverse selection ex ante and the problem of moral hazard ex post.Only with mutual complementary,namely building the relevant inter mechanism which can form a synergistic effect with the fiscal subsidy,can the role of the fiscal subsidy policy be better played.Taking the enterprises listed in China’s A-share market as the study sample,this paper finds that when there is equity incentive and the proportion of equity incentive in executive incentive structure is high,fiscal subsidies can promote enterprises to increase R&D investment.In the end,this paper examines the positive consequences of executive equity incentive as a coordination mechanism of fiscal subsidies in terms of innovation output,talent aggregation effect,total factor productivity and enterprise value.The results show that equity incentive can play a substantial synergistic effect on fiscal subsidies.