多方博弈下建筑工人有意识不安全行为致因分析

Analysis of the Conscious Unsafe Behavior of Construction Workers in Multi-party Games

为有效制定建筑工人有意识不安全行为防范措施,减少建筑施工人为事故的发生,本文结合博弈理论,通过建立多方演化博弈模型,得到了在不同情况下建筑工人、企业高层安全管理方、企业安全监管方期望收益的函数,并根据复制动态方程的平衡点求解各利益方策略的意愿策略,分析了建筑工人有意识不安全行为致因。结果表明,建筑工人有意识不安全行为除与工人自身有关外,还与企业高层安全管理方、安全监管方投入比例有关。此外,根据博弈结果对如何减少工人有意识不安全行为的发生提出了建议。

In order to effectively formulate prevention measures for conscious unsafe behavior of construction workers and reduce the occurrence of man-made accidents in construction,this paper combines game theory and establishes a multi-party evolutionary game model to obtain a function of expected return of construction workers,high-level safety managers,and safety supervision of enterprises in different situations.Based on the willingness strategy of each interested party's strategy to solve the equilibrium point of the dynamic equation,the causes of conscious unsafe behavior of construction workers are analyzed.The results show that the conscious unsafe behavior of construction workers is not only related to the workers themselves,but also related to the proportion of investment by senior safety managers and safety supervisors.In addition,suggestions on how to reduce the occurrence of workers'conscious unsafe behavior are put forward based on the results of the game.