摘要
针对晚近的“情动”理论在内涵、历史与价值上的三重虚无主义,理应先回归德勒兹与斯宾诺莎的文本,在深刻理解“情动”概念的前提下进行有效回应。只不过,德勒兹的诠释亦有得有失,他虽然以“情动”激活了思想内部的生成性强力,但从根本上忽视了“精神治疗”这个《伦理学》中的终极旨归。经由努斯鲍姆对斯多葛派的细致辨析,我们试图在比较的视野之中重新激活“情动”的治疗之力,进而对德勒兹主义与当下这个情感汹涌的时代进行哲学的回应。
Confronted with the“triple”nihilism of the popular affect theory,it is reasonable to return to the text of Deleuze and Spinoza,just to obtain a deeper understanding of the concept of affect.However,Deleuze s interpretation also has some gains and losses.Having insightfully activated the generative power within the mind,he unfortunately missed one of the central points in Ethics,that is,“psychotherapy”.Through Nussbaum s careful analysis of the stoics,we try to reactivate the therapeutic power of affect in a comparative perspective,and then to make a philosophical response to various“Deleuzism”and the current turbulent times burning with affects.
出处
《文化研究》
2019年第3期215-233,共19页
Cultural Studies
基金
国家社科基金一般项目“当代法国哲学的审美维度研究”(17BZX015)
上海市教育发展基金会曙光计划项目“身-言-像:当代法国艺术哲学的三个主题”(12903-412221-17007)的阶段性研究成果。