摘要
中小企业更容易陷入投资不足和投资过度的非效率投资发展困境。基于非效率投资理论和私募股权投资(PE)理论,提出PE影响非效率投资行为的理论假设,研究发现中小企业普遍存在非效率投资行为。相对于投资过度,投资不足问题尤为突出,PE通过控制代理成本和缓解信息不对称矛盾,对中小企业非效率投资具有抑制作用。此外,不同特征条件的PE对非效率投资的影响具有差异性,高持股比例、联合投资的PE对非效率投资的缓解作用更强,且长期滞留在中小企业的PE缓解效应减弱。研究结论验证了PE对中小企业非效率投资行为的抑制作用及其机理。
Small and medium-sized enterprises(SMEs)are more likely to fall into the inefficient investment and development dilemma of under-investment and over-investment.Based on the theory of inefficient investment and private equity investment(PE),this paper puts forward the theoretical hypothesis of PE’s influence on inefficient investment behavior.Through the calculation of the inefficient investment of SMEs,it is found that the inefficient investment behavior of SMEs generally exists;compared with over-investment,the problem of under-investment is particularly serious;PE can restrain the inefficient investment of SMEs by controlling the agency cost and alleviating the information asymmetry contradiction.It is also found that PE with different characteristics has different effects on inefficient investment:PE with high shareholding ratio and joint investment has stronger mitigation effect on inefficient investment,and PE with long-term detention in SMEs has weaker mitigation effect.The results verify the inhibition of PE on the inefficient investment behavior of SMEs and its mechanism.
作者
谢漾
洪正
XIE Yang;HONG Zheng(Institute of Chinese Financial Studies,Southwest University of Finance and Economics,Chengdu 611130,China)
出处
《广东财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第4期58-71,共14页
Journal of Guangdong University of Finance & Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目(19XJL005)。