摘要
清王朝对矿产品的控制,是通过复杂的税费政策来实现的。在一个幅员广阔且各地情形迥异的国家,传统时期的技术手段与信息工具,无法支持朝廷适时追踪各矿厂的实际生产情形,因此清王朝的矿税并非基于一套自上而下制定并推行于全国的法规,它以国家最低成本控制产品并维持矿业发展为原则,具体的标准与税目,因地、因时、因矿种而变化。种种变化之间,又呈现出继承与关联性,因为变化并不是任意的,必须有"事例"可供遵循或参照。这样,"事例"就成为理解矿税实践的关键。"事例"是在地方与朝廷之间的博弈中逐渐形成的,林林总总的矿厂,在税费上大体遵循几个例或对之进行变通,变通的结果,就是新事例的产生。"事例"定税并非矿业中独有的现象,清代其他社会经济领域中,也不乏类似逻辑。
The Qing Dynasty controlled mineral products through complicated tax and fee policies.In a country with a vast territory and a great difference in natural endowment,the traditional technical means and information tools could not support the court to track the actual production situation of various mines in a timely manner.Therefore,the Qing Dynasty’s mining tax,whose principle is the court’s lowest controls the mine product and maintains mining development,was not based on a unified regulations implemented in the whole country.The specific standards and items of tax vary by location,time,and mineral type.Among all kinds of changes,there are inheritance and relevance,because the changes are not arbitrary,and there must be“cases”to follow or refer to.In this way,the“case”becomes the key to understanding the practices of mining tax.These cases are gradually formed in the game between the local government and the imperial court.Various mining plants generally follow or modify a few examples of taxes and fees,and the result of the modifications is the emergence of new cases.“Determining tax by case”is not a unique phenomenon in the mining industry,and there is similar logic in other socio-economic fields in the Qing Dynasty.
出处
《学术研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第8期114-123,178,共11页
Academic Research
基金
教育部人文社科重点研究基地重大项目“清王朝的物资控制、国家运作与地域社会”(16JJD770039)的阶段性成果。