共享单车治理的策略选择和动态演化研究

On the Strategy Choice and Dynamic Evolution of Shared Bicycle Governance

针对共享单车所面临的治理难题,构建共享单车平台企业和用户的演化博弈模型,研究双方行为策略的互动机制,根据均衡点的局部稳定性分析二者的行为策略选择,并运用Matlab仿真演示重要参数变化对演化结果的影响。研究表明:博弈系统中共享单车平台企业和用户的演化稳定策略难以自发实现,平台对违规用车的处罚力度、用户合规用车导致用户成本的降低程度是影响用户违规用车的关键因素,平台是否选择“积极管理”策略主要取决于第三方监管部门对平台的处罚力度和平台的治理成本。

In view of the complex management problems currently faced by shared bicycle governance,an evolutionary game model of shared bicycle platforms and users is built to analyze the interaction mechanism of the behavioral strategies of both parties.The local stability of the equilibrium is used to analyze the behavioral strategy choice of the two parties.Matlab simulation is used to demonstrate the influences of the changes of important parameters on the evolutionary results.The research shows that the evolutionary stabilization strategy of the shared bicycle platforms and users in the game system is difficult to realize spontaneously.The platforms'penalties for illegal bicycle use and the degree of reduction of user costs resulted from users'compliant bicycle use are the key factors to curb users'illegal bicycle use.Platform's“active management”strategy mainly depends on the fines imposed by the third party supervision authority on the platforms and the governance costs of the platforms.