摘要
In this paper,I challenge the standard reading of complete virtue ((α)ρετ(η) τελε(ι)α) in those disputed passages of Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics.I argue that,for Aristotle,complete virtue is neither (i) wisdom nor (ii) a whole set of all virtues.Rather,it is a term used by Aristotle to denote any virtue that is in its complete or perfect form.In light of this reading,I offer a pluralist interpretation of Aristotelian happiness.I argue that for Aristotle,the life-long exercise of a predominant virtue—as long as it is exercised in its complete or perfect form—will suffice for human happiness.The so-called inclusivist and intellectualist notions of Aristotelian happiness,thus understood,are merely two forms (viz.the composite and the non-composite form) of the pluralist notion of Aristotelian happiness.And if I am right,my pluralist interpretation provides an alternative,if not better,solution to the long-standing problem of "dual happiness" in Aristotle.
