问询函监管影响审计收费的作用机制研究

Inquiry Letter Supervision and Audit Fees:Theoretical Mechanism and Empirical Test

为了从源头发现尚在萌芽中的市场风险,证券交易所针对信息披露存在疑点的上市公司,公开对其发出问询函,能够较好地起到事前防控的作用。本文选取了2015-2018年沪深A股非金融上市公司的10833个观察值为研究样本,结合问询函的分类、数量以及滞后效应等维度进行实证分析。研究结果表明,收到问询函的上市公司比没有收到问询函的上市公司支付了更高的审计费用,且针对企业年度报告发放的问询函对审计收费的提高作用会更加明显。更进一步,这一监督作用在企业性质与事务所声誉表现为不同特征情境下存在差异。

in view of the listed companies with doubtful information disclosure,the stock exchange publicizes the contents of the inquiry letter and enterprise reply letter issued to them,which plays the role of prevention and control in advance,from the market risk that is still in the bud.In this paper,10833 observation values of A-share non-financial listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2015 to 2018 are selected as research samples,and empirical analysis is carried out based on the classification,quantity and lag effect of inquiry letters.The results show that the listed companies who receive the inquiry letter pay higher audit fees than those who do not receive the inquiry letter,and the inquiry letter issued for the annual report of the enterprise will play a more obvious role in improving audit fees,which has a lag effect.