摘要
基于代理成本假说和资源约束理论,本文以2007—2017年全部A股上市公司为样本,并利用Cobb-Douglas生产函数的随机前沿模型和多元线性回归模型,考察了债务期限结构对企业创新效率的影响以及产权性质对这一影响的调节作用。研究结果表明:债务期限结构与企业创新效率显著负相关,即长期的债务契约显著抑制企业的创新效率。另外国有企业的产权性质将进一步加剧长期债务期限结构对企业创新效率的负面影响。进一步机制检验表明,长期的债务契约通过加剧企业代理问题、降低资源约束两个渠道对企业创新效率产生抑制作用。
Based on the agency cost hypothesis and resource constraint theory,this paper uses all A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2017 as the samples,and it investigates the impact of debt maturity structure on innovation efficiency of enterprises and the moderating effect of property rights on this impact by using the stochastic frontier analysis model of Cobb-Douglas production function and multiple linear regression model.The results show that the debt maturity structure is remarkably negative correlated with the innovation efficiency of enterprises,that is,the long-term debt contract significantly inhibits the innovation efficiency of enterprises.In addition,the property right nature of state-owned enterprises will further aggravate the negative impact of debt maturity structure on the innovation efficiency of enterprises.The further mechanism test shows that the long-term debt contract can inhibit the innovation efficiency of enterprises by aggravating the agency problem of enterprises and reducing the resource constraint.
作者
张晓琳
李一馨
王华珺
Zhang Xiaolin;Li Yixin;Wang Huajun(School of Economic and Management,Tianjin University of Science and Technology,Tianjin 300222,China;Beijing Didi Infinite Technology Development Co.,Ltd.,Beijing 100193,China)
出处
《金融发展研究》
北大核心
2020年第8期74-81,共8页
Journal Of Financial Development Research
基金
天津市高等学校大学生创新训练计划项目“柔性激励机制对企业创新绩效的影响研究”(202010057055)。
关键词
创新效率
产权性质
代理成本假说
资源约束理论
SFA
innovation efficiency
nature of the property right
agency cost hypothesis
resource constraint theory
SFA