市场交易补偿可再生能源的正外部性研究

Research on the compensation of positive externality ofrenewable energy through market trading

探索以绿色电力证书交易为载体的配额制政策(RPS),有利于通过市场化手段来补偿可再生能源发电带来的环境及社会正外部收益,并在一定程度上缓解当前可再生能源发展所面临的消纳不足问题。考虑由消费端承担配额义务并引入二次惩罚函数,构建包含电力生产端、消费端在内的序贯博弈模型。结合实际设置参数,分析影响政策效果的因素和作用机理。结果表明:①RPS政策下,当配额力度加大时,绿色电力证书的价格呈现先增后减的特征;②罚金一定时的社会福利函数关于配额的增加呈倒“U”型分布;③配额和罚金均过低、均过高都不利于证书交易行为的实现。可再生能源与化石能源发电成本差距越大,对应的最优配额越小。因此,要将配额、罚金和成本差距结合起来考虑,确保中国可再生能源电力产业在“看不见的手”的市场机制下达到社会福利最优水平。最后,运用数值模拟的方法对配额制和固定上网电价政策(FIT)的规制效果进行比较,发现:①RPS政策的最优规制价格低于其在FIT政策下的值;②配额水平偏低时,FIT政策的社会福利水平高于RPS政策,反之则反。因此,在可再生能源电力产业发展的初级阶段,FIT政策相对较优;在市场规模较大和技术较成熟阶段,RPS政策相对较优。中国在推进配额制的实施过程中,可将两种政策结合起来,在一部分省份或地区继续保留FIT政策,而在可再生能源发电技术较为成熟的省份或地区作为试点率先实行RPS政策。

Exploring the Renewable Portfolio Standard(RPS)based on the tradable green certificate will contribute to the compensation for the environmental and social positive external benefits brought by renewable energy generation through market-oriented means,and to the alleviation of the insufficient consumption problems faced by the development of renewable energy to a certain extent.Considering that the consumer side assumes quota obligations and models the penalty as a quadratic loss function,a sequential game model including the power production side and the consumer side is constructed.This study attempts to calibrate the parameters according to the actual situation of renewable energy power development in China,and to analyze the factors and function mechanism that affect the policy effectiveness.The results show that:①Under the RPS policy,when the quota increases,the price of green certificate increases initially and decreases afterwards.②When the penalty is fixed,the social welfare function has an inverted U-shaped distribution with the increase of quota.③When the quota and the penalty are too low or too high,they are not conducive to the realization of certificate trading.The larger the gap between the cost of renewable energy generation and that of fossil energy generation,the smaller the corresponding optimal quota.Therefore,it is necessary to take all the three factors of penalty,quota and cost gap into consideration to ensure that the Chinese renewable energy power industry achieves the optimal level of social welfare under the market mechanism of the‘invisible hand’.Then,the numerical simulation method is used to compare the effect of the RPS with that of the Feed-in Tariff(FIT).It is found that:①The optimal regulation price of the RPS policy is lower than its value under the FIT policy.②When the quota level is low,the social welfare level of the FIT policy is higher than that of the RPS policy,and vice versa.Therefore,the FIT policy is relatively superior in the basic stage of renewable energy power generation industry.In the larger market scale and mature technology stage,the RPS policy is relatively favorable.In the process of promoting the implementation of the RPS,China can combine the two policies,continue to maintain the FIT policy in some provinces or regions,and take the lead in implementing the RPS policy as a pilot in provinces or regions with mature renewable energy power generation technology.