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债务契约与研发支出会计政策隐性选择——基于税收视角

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摘要 以我国创业板上市公司2013-2018年数据为样本,研究债务融资规模对企业研发支出资本化的影响,并从税收视角出发,将现金流约束与实际税率作为调节变量进行进一步研究。实证结果表明,企业债务融资规模与研发支出资本化强度、非正常研发支出资本化之间显著正相关,而对于正常研发支出资本化影响不显著。基于我国的研发支出税收优惠政策,企业内部现金流约束与实际税率会对债务融资规模与研发支出资本化强度之间的正相关关系有所抑制。
作者 谭伊洲
出处 《西部财会》 2020年第8期55-58,共4页 Western Finance and Accounting
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