腐败、官员治理与经济发展

Corruption, Officials Governance and Economic Development

本文建立了一个模型来解释腐败和经济发展的关系。企业采取不合规技术会导致经济增长,但会带来腐败问题。在经济发展早期,不合规技术的负外部性不大,官员的激励比较重要,此时会出现一个腐败均衡:高腐败、高增长、多事故和弱问责。在经济较发达时期,不合规技术的负外部性较大,政府会加强对企业的管制并严厉打击腐败,这导致了一个无腐败均衡:无腐败、低增长、无事故和强问责。本文的研究为反腐败和经济新常态提供了一个解释。

In this paper we establish a political economy model to clarify the relationship between corruption and economic development in China. In the early stage of economic development, there is a corruption equilibrium: high level of corruption, many accidents caused, high economic growth and weak accountability to bureaucrats. In advanced stage of economic development, the central government will fight corruption, leading to a non-corrupt equilibrium: no corruption, no accidents, low economic growth and strong accountability. This research explains the appearance anti-corruption campaign and the New Normal.